usefulness of friendship in gaining self-knowledge, its usefulness in gaining knowledge of others, and the danger that it may lead us to misjudge others, all stem from the contrast between the subjective perspective we naturally take on ourselves and the more objective perspective we naturally take on others. Friendship can help us to, and may even obligate us to, take up perspectives on ourselves and others that we would be less likely to adopt in its absence, and this shifting of perspectives brings with it both epistemic opportunities and epistemic dangers.
Friendship's Contribution to Self-Knowledge
Friendship is explicitly (and famously) claimed, not just to facilitate self-knowledge, but to be essential for it, in Aristotle's Magna Moralia:
Since then it is both a most difficult thing, as some of the sages have said, to attain a knowledge of oneself, and also a most pleasant (for to know oneself is pleasant) --now we are not able to see what we are from ourselves (and that we cannot do so is plain from the way in which we blame others without being aware that we do the same things ourselves; and this is the effect of favour or passion, and there are many of us who are blinded by these things so that we judge not aright); as then when we wish to see our own face, we do so by looking into the mirror, in the same way when we wish to know ourselves we can obtain that knowledge by looking at our friend. For the friend is, as we assert, a second self. If, then, it is pleasant to know oneself, and it is not possible to know this without having someone else for a friend, the self-sufficing man will require friendship in order to know himself (Aristotle 1213a13-26) . 1 3 Here is a mundane example of the sort of self-knowledge Aristotle seems to have in mind here.
On a recent visit to see my father, I noticed that he often puffs out his cheeks when he exhales, in a way that frankly looks a little silly. After observing this several times, I was suddenly struck by an uncomfortable thought: when I am feeling a bit anxious or uneasy, I often expel my breath by blowing rather than merely exhaling. I tried this in front of a mirror and, sure enough, it gave me exactly the same rather silly appearance I had noticed on my father.
Although the example is trivial, it exhibits the general pattern of reasoning that Aristotle seems to be calling attention to. The pattern is something like this:
My father sometimes looks silly when he exhales.
I am like my father.
Therefore, (perhaps) I sometimes look silly when I exhale.
This argument is obviously not deductively valid. In fact perhaps it is not best regarded as an argument at all. It might better be regarded as a way of generating hypotheses which may be worth further testing. Indeed, this is precisely what happened in my own case: once I had hypothesized that I might have the same expression as my father, I then tested the hypothesis by literally examining myself in a mirror.
There are two main difficulties with Aristotle's understanding of the contribution of friendship to self-knowledge, at least on this interpretation. The first is that I am likely to be similar not only to my friends, but to other people as well. So if the above pattern of reasoning is an example of what he has in mind, then it is not clear why he thinks that friends are necessary for self-knowledge. As Zena Hitz notes, "it seems that any argument for the value of friendship based on similarity will have difficulties limiting the relevant similarities to friends" (Hitz 10) . I might have reason to think that I am very similar to people with whom I am not friends, and if 4 so, I could apply the same pattern of reasoning to them. Although this point raises difficulties for the interpretation of Aristotle, however, it does not diminish the value of the above pattern of reasoning, which offers a way that friends can help us to achieve self-knowledge, even if this way of facilitating self-knowledge is not unique to friendship.
Hitz responds to this first difficulty with the Aristotelian view by suggesting that Aristotle "understands friendship to involve collaborative activity, and so the friend is another self in the sense of being a helper rather than a mirror" (Hitz 10) . But Hitz's main concern is not with the Magna Moralia account, but with an argument in Nicomachean Ethics 9.9; and the kind of selfknowledge she focuses on is knowledge of one's essential nature rather than of one's character (Hitz 18n59) . As long as we are not concerned to argue that only friends can facilitate selfknowledge, there seems to be no reason to deny that friends can be mirrors as well as helpers, and that in both roles they can help us to achieve knowledge of ourselves.
A second and perhaps more serious difficulty with the Aristotelian view is that we might not be similar to our friends, so that the second premise of the above argument might be false. Of course, it is a central feature of the Aristotelian account of friendship that we must be similar in character to our primary friends, but this is often questioned in the literature on friendship. Dean Cocking and Jeannette Kennett, for example, claim that "one's close friends need not be markedly similar to oneself, as is claimed by the mirror account" (Cocking and Kennett 503). 2 Cocking and Kennett suggest that the mirror view of friendship should be replaced by an alternative account that emphasizes interpretation rather than reflection: "You do not passively reflect my own characteristics; what you give back to me is not a reflection, but an interpretation of me, and for this you do not need to be like me. The better analogy here is not of a mirror but a portrait" (Cocking and Kennett 509). 3 
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We have in the literature, then, several related ways in which friendship can facilitate selfknowledge. The crucial point I would like to emphasize about all of them, though, is that they all provide ways in which I can attain a perspective on my own character which is more like the objective, third-person perspective I naturally have on others, thereby to some extent overcoming the blindness to my own failings and overestimation of my own virtues that I am normally prone to. John Cooper puts this very well when he describes the Aristotelian view as holding that friendship can be "the needed bridge by which to convert objectivity about others into objectivity about oneself" (Cooper 322).
Friendship's Contribution to Knowledge of Others
Although the literature contains extensive discussions of the role of friendship in facilitating self-knowledge by helping us to achieve a more objective perspective on ourselves, there seems to be surprisingly little discussion of the converse, so to speak. But it seems equally noteworthy that if friendships can help us to take an objective perspective on ourselves, they can also help us to achieve a subjective perspective on others. And this too seems to bring potential epistemic advantages: if we can take a more first-person, subjective perspective on others, we may achieve a better understanding of their perspective on their own lives. Elizabeth Telfer puts this well:
Friendship can enlarge our knowledge throughout the whole gamut of human experience, by enabling us in some measure to adopt the viewpoint of another person through our sympathetic identification with him. Through friendship we can know what it is like to feel or think or do certain things which we do not feel, think or do ourselves. And our 6 knowledge is not merely knowledge by description, but knowledge by acquaintance, derived from our sympathetic sharing of his experience (Telfer 240 ).
Transition to Epistemic Dangers
I have suggested that the epistemic benefits of friendship have to do in part with the relationship between subjective and objective perspectives. We find it difficult to take an objective perspective on our own characteristics, and we find it difficult to achieve a subjective understanding of what the world is like for others. Friendship can help with both tasks. It can help us to see our own virtues and flaws from an objective standpoint, and it can help us to understand and empathize with others based on a richer understanding of how they experience the world.
The success of these means to greater knowledge depends on the fact that each perspective is conducive to certain sorts of knowledge, even as it hinders others. Our understanding of our own experiences, motivations, and rationalizations from our first-person perspective gives us a genuine knowledge of ourselves that it is difficult for others to achieve, and friendship can help us to gain something approaching this perspective on the experiences, motivations, and rationalizations of others. On the other hand, our objective assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of others is often more likely to be just and accurate than their assessment of themselves (or our assessment of ourselves), and our friends can help us to achieve this valuable objectivity with respect to our own life and character.
But if each perspective facilitates certain kinds of knowledge and endangers others, then there is also the possibility that the transfer will work in the wrong direction. Perhaps there is little danger that we will overextend a third-person perspective on our own lives, using it to 7 analyze aspects of our experience that are better understood subjectively. But it is all too possible that in extending a first-person perspective to our friends, we will also apply to them the very sorts of mistaken assessments we are so prone to with regard to our own character. Our natural tendency to ignore our own flaws and overestimate our strengths can easily be extended to our friends. 4 Then instead of gaining valuable objectivity about our own strengths and weaknesses through our interactions with our friends, we may find that we lose our objectivity about theirs.
(To put the point in the crudest possible way, the mirror view suggests that we should reason: I Although losing objectivity precisely where it is most valuable is a genuine danger of friendship, nothing I have said so far supports the idea that it is a necessary or constitutive feature. It would seem that we should strive to apply each perspective to the domain to which it is most appropriate, understanding both our friends and ourselves subjectively, but assessing both ourselves and our friends objectively. However, matters may be more complicated than this. Simon Keller (2004) and Sarah Stroud (2006) have both argued that friendship does not merely make it more likely that we will make false judgments about our friends, but that it brings with it an actual obligation to form beliefs about our friends in ways that are epistemically irrational. It is this idea that I want to explore, and criticize, in the remainder of this paper.
Epistemic Dangers of Friendship
Keller and epistemic irrationality" (Stroud 518 ). I think that it's true that friendship may require epistemic partiality, in several senses. But I will argue that in none of these senses is such partiality irrational or epistemically objectionable. Friendship may sometimes lead people to genuine epistemic irrationality, but this is a pathology of friendship, not a constitutive feature.
A Bayesian Approach
A surprising feature of both Keller's and Stroud's essays is the absence of any discussion of subjective probabilities or degrees of belief. Both almost exclusively treat belief as an all-ornothing matter. 5 Why is this surprising? In part, because they are discussing the relationship between hypotheses and the evidence for them, and evidence rarely establishes or refutes a hypothesis; rather, it adds or diminishes support, altering our confidence in the hypothesis without necessarily making the difference between belief and disbelief, or between either of these and suspension of belief. If we want a nuanced discussion of whether and how friends respond differently to evidence than non-friends, it seems that we will need to consider degrees of confidence.
Another reason the absence of any discussion of degrees of conviction is surprising is that both Keller and Stroud stress that the effects of epistemic partiality are subtle. Stroud writes that 9 "the good friend's epistemic stance seems to involve a relative (although not, as we noted, an absolute) imperviousness to new evidence, a slowness to update her beliefs in the light of new data'' (Stroud 514). These remarks seem to cry out for some acknowledgment of degrees of belief! A relative, but not absolute, imperviousness to evidence --doesn't it seem plausible to interpret this to mean that although the friend will adjust his or her degrees of belief to some extent in light of new evidence, the result will be higher or lower than that of a non-friend? And although her reference to slower updating of beliefs could be interpreted digitally (no change in belief until the evidence is substantial, then a move from disbelief to belief), surely it is more helpful to look at this difference at a finer-grained level: the friend and non-friend alter their convictions in the same direction in light of new evidence, but the friend's convictions move in that direction more slowly (in the case of negative beliefs; more quickly in the case of positive ones).
I thus propose to look at Keller's and Stroud's examples and arguments from an epistemological perspective different from the one they themselves bring to bear. In point of fact neither Keller nor Stroud is very specific about their epistemological point of view. Stroud does consider one specific epistemological view, Conee and Feldman's evidentialism (Conee and Feldman 2004) , but neither commits herself to it nor discusses alternative views. (Given that she wants her conclusions to generalize to other epistemological views, evidentialism may be a poor choice to focus on, since it would appear to particularly favor her conclusions. 6 ) Keller writes that "it is very plausible to think that there is an epistemic norm telling us that our beliefs should, in standard cases at least, be responsive only to the evidence, or to what we take to be the evidence, for or against their truth" (Keller 334), and mentions other epistemic norms he takes to be plausible , but without relating them to specific work in epistemology.
I propose to consider the issue from the perspective of Bayesian epistemology, which focuses on subjective probabilities instead of all-or-nothing beliefs. 7 I think that from this perspective we will see a very natural and plausible way of reconciling epistemic rationality with the phenomena to which Keller and Stroud call attention.
It will be helpful to keep in mind an analogy between the epistemic behavior of friends, and we need hypotheses to evaluate. Supposing we have a specific hypothesis H that we want to evaluate in the light of a specific piece of new evidence E, the Bayesian says that the probability we should assign to H given E is P(H|E), the conditional probability of H given E. Determining this value requires a prior probability P(H), the degree to which we believe H prior to considering the new evidence E. (The prior probability may or may not itself be the posterior probability resulting from the evaluation of a previous piece of evidence.) We also need a probability for E, which we can determine if we know P(E|H) and P(E| ¬H), i.e. the conditional probability of E given that H is true, and the conditional probability of E given that H is false (making its negation ¬ H true). 8 With these ideas in mind, let us turn to Keller's and Stroud's specific claims.
Two Examples
Keller's and Stroud's arguments that friendship is epistemically dangerous depend heavily on our reaction to examples. Each offers examples about which the reader is expected to agree (a) that a good friend should exhibit certain epistemic behaviors or dispositions, and (b) that these behaviors or dispositions are epistemically objectionable, at least by the standards of prominent epistemological views. It will be useful to have their main examples before us.
Samantha's Poetry Reading
Keller's primary example concerns a poetry reading:
Rebecca is scheduled to give a poetry reading at a café. She is nervous about reading her poetry in public, but has decided to do it on this occasion because she knows that a certain literary agent will be present and she hopes that her work might catch his attention. She lets her good friend Eric know that she will be giving the reading, and asks whether he would mind coming along to be in the office.
Eric, as it happens, is a regular visitor to the café, and has over time accumulated strong evidence for his belief that poetry read there is almost always mediocre, and that it is very unlikely that anything read there would make any literary agent take notice. He had not known that Rebecca fancies herself as a poet, and has no familiarity with her work. But he is her friend, and he makes sure that he is there for the reading (Keller 2004, 332 ).
Sam's Apparent Insensitivity
Stroud's main example concerns receiving information about a friend which puts the friend in a bad light:
Suppose . . . that someone tells a damning story about a friend of yours. Your friend appears in a bad light in this tale; he is portrayed as having acted badly, even disreputably. The speaker is clearly rather shocked and disapproving of your friend's behavior; she has obviously formed an unfavorable judgment of your friend's actions and perhaps even his overall character. And it must be confessed that your friend comes off looking rather bad from the information conveyed. . . . Suppose, for instance, that a third party reports that your friend Sam recently slept with someone and then cruelly never returned any of that person's calls, knowingly breaking that person's heart.
Epistemic Partiality: Favorable Initial Beliefs
Keller contrasts the epistemic attitudes and responses of a friend before, during, and after the acquisition of new evidence. Stroud emphasizes the response to evidence and the resulting beliefs, but has less to say about the friend's attitudes prior to acquiring a new piece of evidence.
I would like to begin with the appropriate attitudes of a friend prior to acquiring new evidence, so I will begin with Keller's example.
Recall that Eric has evidence that most of the poetry read at the café at which Rebecca is about to read is mediocre. Keller writes:
If some stranger were about to give the reading, then Eric would believe that the poetry he is about to hear will probably be pretty awful, not of the type that is likely to impress a literary agent ---and he would have good evidence for his belief. Seeing as he is Rebecca's good friend, though, and seeing as he is there to offer her support, he ought not, before she takes the stage, have those beliefs about her. He ought not be expecting that the poetry about to come out of Rebecca's mouth will be awful. Yet, the fact that Rebecca is Eric's friend, rather than a stranger, does not make it any less likely that her poetry will be awful, and there is no need to imagine that Eric, as a friend, should think that it does (Keller 332).
I believe that Eric's knowledge that most of the poetry read at this café is bad is a somewhat distracting and misleading feature of this example. It is true that if most of the people who read poetry at this location are bad poets, and if Eric randomly selects a poetry-reader from this population, then he should assign a high probability to the proposition that the reader is a bad poet. That is a straightforward inductive inference. But in the present example, the poetry reader Eric is interested in is his friend, not a randomly selected sample. As far as I can see, Eric has no reason to think that Rebecca is a typical reader of poetry at this establishment, and therefore his knowledge concerning most of the poets represented there has no bearing on his opinion of Rebecca's poetry. does not say that Eric should believe that Rebecca is a good poet, only that in the face of evidence to the contrary, he should not believe that she is not a good poet. However, in a later passage he speaks more generally of a "requirement that you be disposed to think well of your friends," arguing that this requirement "can extend beyond the cases in which you already have good evidentiary reason to do so" (Keller 2004, 337) . So what Keller seems to have in mind is that there is a general requirement that we think well of our friends; in the absence of any evidence, this will lead us to actually believe positive things about a friend, while if there is evidence to the contrary, it may only lead us to suspend disbelief.
Restricting ourselves to the case in which we have no evidence, we might try this as a first attempt at a general principle Keller would accept:
If H is a positive hypothesis about a friend of S, and S has no evidence relevant to the truth or falsity of H, then S should believe H. This is certainly too strong, however. For one thing, there are a great many positive things one might believe about a friend, and many of them are incompatible with one another (at least given our other beliefs). For instance, should Eric believe that Rebecca is a brilliant nuclear physicist in the absence of any evidence? But if so then by the same token he should believe that she is a brilliant geneticist, a brilliant organic chemist, a brilliant mathematician, and so on. Given plausible beliefs about the amount of study required to achieve excellence in these fields, these hypotheses are incompatible with one another.
It looks as though we need additional constraints in the antecedent of our conditional in order to have a plausible sufficient condition for belief in the positive hypothesis H. There are few other aspects of the story that we might appeal to, however; we certainly can't restrict H to hypotheses about poetic ability, since the moral of the story is supposed to apply much more broadly. Perhaps the most plausible additional constraint we can derive from the story is that Eric is in a situation in which his belief in Rebecca's poetic ability will be helpful to Rebecca. This suggests that the relevant principle might be something more like this:
If H is a positive hypothesis about a friend of S, and S has no evidence relevant to the truth or falsity of H, and S's believing H will be helpful to the friend, then S should believe H. If H is a positive hypothesis about a friend of S, and S has no evidence relevant to the truth or falsity of H, and S's believing H will be helpful to the friend, then S should assign H a probability higher than .5. perhaps it is simpler than rival hypotheses, or more conservative in the sense that it involves smaller changes to current theories than its rivals. Arguably, none of these reasons for belief is evidential. But would we really regard a scientist as irrational if she believed H for these reasons?
Her belief in H would of course be tentative, subject to change once H is actually tested;
but that is true in the example of Eric and Rebecca as well. Moreover, "S believes that H" might be too strong to really capture the attitude that seems rational; "S is inclined to believe that H is true" and the like might be better descriptions of the appropriate attitude. As I mentioned above, this also seems to be true in the case of Rebecca and Eric. With these provisos, though, it seems to me that it is entirely epistemically reasonable for a scientist to have a more positive attitude toward H than toward rival hypotheses, even if there is as yet no relevant evidence, for any of the reasons just mentioned. If that is correct, then evidentialism is false, and it can be epistemically rational to hold a belief, or at least have a subjective probability greater than one has for rival hypotheses, even in the absence of positive evidence.
In any case, this is certainly a widely held point of view among Bayesian epistemologists and philosophers of science. The prior distribution from which a Bayesian analysis proceeds reflects a person's beliefs before the experimental results are known. Those beliefs are subjective, in the sense that they are shaped in part by elusive, idiosyncratic influences, so they are likely to vary from person to person. . . . it has been argued that the difficulty may be stemmed at the source by repudiating subjective in favor of purely objective prior probabilities . . . although the idea that scientific theories possess unique, objectively correct, inductive probabilities is eminently appealing, it has so far resisted determined efforts at a satisfactory analysis, except in the special cases of tautologies and contradictions, and there is now a wide consensus that no such analysis is possible (Howson and Urbach 237-238).
Epistemic Partiality: Differential Effects of Evidence
Stroud and Keller both stress that friends will not only begin with a more favorable assessment than a neutral observer might have, but will also respond differently to new evidence.
It is certainly appropriate to stress this, because the way people react to the evidence seems to be the most important single factor in determining whether they are being epistemically rational.
But a crucial point that Stroud and Keller seem to miss (or at least do not mention) is that it is entirely rational for two people to assign different posterior probabilities to a hypothesis after assessing the same evidence, provided they had different prior probabilities for the hypothesis before taking the new evidence into account. It seems to me that this simple fact is enough to account for the responses to evidence of the friends in their stories, and thus that they have not shown that there is any epistemic irrationality involved in their examples of epistemic partiality.
The appropriate effect of prior probabilities on the posterior probability is fairly dramatic.
Although assigning specific numbers may seem a bit silly, it will help in gaining a vivid sense of the effect of the prior probability. In Stroud's example, let us suppose that the friend assigns a prior probability of .9 to the hypothesis that Sam always acts honorably. And let us suppose that an "objective" or disinterested observer would assign a prior probability of .5 to the same hypothesis, since the disinterested observer has no reason, epistemic or otherwise, to favor one belief or the other. Now, suppose that both the friend and the disinterested observer agree that the probability of someone saying what Sam said, given that they always act honorably, is fairly low, say .3.
And suppose they also agree that the probability of someone who doesn't always act honorably making this remark is much higher, say .7. If both the friend and the disinterested observer update the probability they assign to the hypothesis in accordance with Bayes's Theorem, they will end up with very different results. The friend will assign the hypothesis a posterior probability of .79, while the disinterested observer will assign it a posterior probability of .3.
Tinkering with the numbers a bit, we can make the example even starker. Suppose both observers agree that P(E|H) = .2 and that P(E| ¬H) = .9. The disinterested observer will assign an extremely low posterior probability to the hypothesis, .18. Meanwhile the friend will still, entirely rationally, think it more likely than not that their friend always acts honorably: the friend's posterior probability will be .667.
As additional evidence comes in, if it all points in the same direction, the friend and the disinterested observer will converge on the same assessment (this is what is known as the "washing out of the priors"). But if their belief formation processes are rational, as Bayesianism interprets this, then they actually should not converge on the same probability after assessing only a single piece of evidence. And as we have just seen, their posterior probabilities can differ very dramatically even if they are both evaluating the evidence in the same, equally rational way.
My suggestion is, then, that the differential responses to evidence of friends and non-friends is not in fact a second sort of epistemic partiality: rather, it is simply a consequence of our first sort, the different prior probabilities that friends and non-friends may assign to hypotheses.
Matters would be quite different if the two observers actually followed different rules in updating their subjective probabilities. Suppose that a friend and a Bayesian, even if they began with the same prior probabilities, and agreed on P(E|H) and P(E| ¬H), would nevertheless end up with different posterior probabilities. In that case, the Bayesian will be committed to the view that the friend really is being epistemically irrational (assuming that the disinterested observer updates in accordance with Bayesian conditionalization). But nothing in the examples discussed by Stroud and Keller gives us any reason to think that friendship requires this kind of epistemic irrationality. It seems quite plausible that their epistemically rational differences in prior probabilities are enough to explain the differences in their posteriors. We can imagine a case in which friendship leads someone to go beyond assigning high prior probabilities to positive views about a friend, and to respond irrationally to the evidence: but there seems to be no reason to regard such irrationality as required by friendship.
Epistemic Partiality: Constructing Hypotheses and Seeking Evidence
Having considered whether a friend and a disinterested observer can rationally have different prior probabilities in the absence of relevant evidence, and whether they may rationally assign different posterior probabilities upon considering the same piece of evidence, let us briefly consider two further sorts of epistemic partiality. The first is the possibility that people will more assiduously seek out alternative hypotheses to explain evidence that might appear to support negative conclusions about their friends than they would for non-friends. Stroud writes: "[W]e will go to greater lengths in the case of a friend to construct and to entertain less damning interpretations of the reported conduct than we would for a nonfriend. This takes effort: these alternative explanations may not be obvious, and we may need to devote considerable mental resources to working them up and considering their merits" (Stroud 506). 10 The second and final sort of epistemic partiality is that in addition to working harder to construct hypotheses to test, a friend may also be motivated to look harder for evidence by means of which to test those hypotheses.
Both of these final forms of epistemic partiality feature conscious effort in a way that the first two forms do not. A good friend will probably not consciously set out to assign high prior probabilities to positive estimates of a friend's character and abilities; a good friend will simply be more likely to find him or herself with such a higher assessment. But the construction of hypotheses and the gathering of evidence are activities which must be engaged in consciously and with effort. It seems very plausible that both activities are likely to be characteristic of the epistemic behavior of friends by comparison with disinterested observers.
One point to make about this is that in some cases, actively seeking out hypotheses to test and evidence by means of which to test them may make it more rather than less likely that we will discover the truth. This is a main theme of Troy Jollimore's detailed discussion of Keller's and Stroud's essays. As Jollimore writes: "Although it is, in one sense, evidence of a certain epistemic imperfection --a perfect epistemic agent would approach every situation with the kind of open-minded, full, and generous attention that we, on the whole, reserve for our friends --it does not follow from this that such instances of special attention are to be condemned in epistemic terms" (Jollimore 59).
But even aside from whether the active search for hypotheses and evidence is more likely to lead to the truth, it is worth noting that this same eagerness to find and test favorable hypotheses is characteristic of work in the sciences. Ever since Hans Reichenbach introduced the distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification, and wrote that "epistemology is only concerned in constructing the context of justification" (Reichenbach 7) , it has been common in the philosophy of science to stress that scientific methodology is concerned only with how hypotheses get confirmed or disconfirmed, not with where they come from in the first place. 11 It doesn't matter so much where the hypotheses come from (even if they come from 22 a desire to save one's pet theory, or to believe the best about one's friend); what matters is how we assesses the hypotheses in the light of the evidence. Similarly, we would not be surprised or critical if a scientist works harder at testing her own theories than those of others, so long as she does not fudge the data and properly updates her assessment of the theory in light of it.
If this behavior is epistemically rational for a scientist, then it seems that the similar behavior of friends is also epistemically rational. Keller's and Stroud's inventories of the kinds of hypotheses friends will seek for is very plausible, but gives us no reason to think that the friends are doing anything epistemically objectionable.
Conclusion
We have seen why friendship may in some cases require epistemic partiality. And we have distinguished several distinct sorts of epistemic partiality: friends may assign different prior probabilities than non-friends; as a consequence of this, they may arrive at different posterior probabilities after considering exactly the same evidence as a non-friend; they may work harder to construct alternative hypotheses to evaluate than a non-friend would; and they may work harder to test hypotheses than a non-friend would. I have argued that all of these sorts of epistemic partiality are in fact entirely epistemically rational.
There is much room here for further exploration. What are the differences between the subjective, first-person perspective we typically have on ourselves, and the objective, third- 
